Atrocity prevention in an illiberal world. The role of a small state in the UN Security Council.

How can a small state such as Norway, with its seat in the UN Security Council, prevent atrocities like genocide and crimes against humanity? Is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine too contested in the current world order? What are the lessons learned from other elected members of the UN Security Council?

On 9 November 2021, the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies discussed these timely and urgent matters. Keynote speaker was Karen Smith, lecturer in International Relations at the Institute for History at Leiden University and former Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect. Discussants were Cecilie Hellestveit (Norwegian Academy of International Law), Angela Muvumba Sellström (Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala) and Kristoffer Lidén (PRIO).

Keynote speaker, Karen Smith:

  • The international community has done very little to prevent atrocities in cases such as Syria, Yemen, the DRC, Ethiopia, Myanmar and Xinjiang.

  • These failures are in the implementation, rather than the principles, of R2P and atrocity prevention.

  • Although we must be careful of drawing a clear distinction between a highpoint of human rights and the current era, there is currently a crisis of the rules-based liberal order. Importantly, the commitment to human rights by Western states should not be seen as a given. At the same time, we know that states from the global south have been instrumental in promoting human rights and atrocity prevention.

  • A worrying trend is the rise in online hate speech and incitement to violence.

  • Atrocity crimes are linked to war and conflict, but not always a direct result of conflict. Atrocity crimes can have a destabilizing effect and might actually lead to conflict. Atrocities can often be carried out by the state in the absence of interstate war. Therefore, atrocities require different responses compared to armed conflict. Peacebuilding will not necessarily remove the risks of mass atrocities. Furthermore, democratization processes may actually trigger mass atrocities. The atrocity prevention perspective is different from peacebuilding and democratization.

  • The protection of civilians (PoC) doctrine may offer protection, but is limited to conflict situations and peacekeeping operations, whereas R2P is applicable to all populations and all situations.

  • The UNSC does not do atrocity prevention well. The Council usually have reactive policies. In addition, the UNSC tends to attempt to create stability, but stability does not necessarily prevent all atrocities.

  • It remains sensitive to make explicit references to R2P in Council deliberations and to address situations from this perspective. The sensitivity is mainly due to the “ghost of Libya” and the persistent misconception that R2P is only about military intervention, particularly in the context of the UNSC. These misconceptions miss the point that the core element of R2P is the commitment to the prevention of atrocity crimes.

  • Norway has historically a lot of experience with international diplomacy. Still, as a small state and only a temporary member in the Security Council its power is limited. However, such small states can play an important role in setting the agenda and try to push certain important initiatives, even in policy areas that are sensitive and where resolutions may be vetoed. Particularly, elected members of the UNSC can use their presidency of the council to set the agenda. Further, elected members can advocate against the use of veto in cases of mass atrocities.

  • Importantly, Norway and other elected members should raise the issue that one cannot just approach situations like Ethiopia or Syria or Myanmar as humanitarian crises or conflicts, but also to think of these situations in terms of the risk of atrocities - to apply an atrocity prevention lens.

  • Finally, all UN Member states, including Western countries like Norway, need to be held responsible for their atrocity prevention policies not just internationally, but also domestically.

For further suggestions on how small states can prevent atrocities, and specific country examples, see Karen Smith’s full keynote speech:

Main points from panel discussion:

  • The problem of partiality in relation to responses to atrocity crimes. This sets atrocity prevention apart from for example peace diplomacy, and challenges the view that the UNSC should be impartial. Once a situation is labelled a mass atrocity, impartiality is impossible. At the same time, this desire for impartiality from diplomatic and humanitarian actors, may lead to a failure to address atrocity crimes.

  • The main task of the UN charter and the UNSC is to prevent inter-state wars. Although R2P is about much more than military intervention, the use of military force is a last resort and inseparably linked to atrocity prevention in the context of the UNSC. Such use of force may destabilize inter-state relations, and there is therefore a lack of willingness to use force to prevent atrocities.

  • Comparing R2P and the potential of atrocity prevention in the Council to the Women, peace and Security (WPS) agenda, the two agendas are of course very different. However, some important lessons from Sweden’s time in the council and their promotion of WPS can be learned. Sweden did not use its presidency of the council specifically to promote WPS. Rather, the country used its time in the Council to create trust and push for feminism and equality. Sweden played an important role in making WPS an everyday issue that remains in the SC to this day.

  • Further, in comparing R2P to the WPS agenda, the “feminist foreign policy” and WPS agenda has a broad and strong constituency in civil society, which R2P seems to be lacking.

  • R2P was abused by NATO in Libya and failed utterly in Syria, illustrating the need for better ways to respond to mass atrocities. There is clearly a need to rebuild the normative framework for atrocity prevention, but because of its political connotations it may be counterproductive to use the term R2P in the UN.

  • Humanitarian action should not be detached from R2P. Humanitarian action is important, but it does not remove the responsibility to protect, which remains with the states.

  • There is too often a lack of knowledge about the places we want to prevent or respond to atrocities. Added to this, misinformation is a major problem that further impede knowledge.

The full seminar, including the panel discussion, can be viewed here:

Background

In 2020, the world marked the 15th anniversary of the unanimous adoption of R2P. R2P was meant to catalyze national and international action to prevent atrocities as witnessed in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. However, R2P has lost some of its universal support – in part due to the controversies surrounding the international R2P intervention in Libya and in part because governments are not able or willing to implement the promise R2P makes. Political actors and diplomats may prefer other concepts, such as Protection of Civilians (PoC). At the same time, calls from activists in places such as Myanmar show the normative strength of the R2P principle, across regional divides.

Regardless of the status of R2P, future occurrence of mass atrocity crimes will require new prevention efforts and protection of populations at risk. In this seminar we asked what role a small state like Norway can play to prevent mass atrocities, against the backdrop of an increasingly illiberal world order.

On the project

This project on Nordic approaches to atrocity prevention at the UN is co-organized by Martin Mennecke (University of Southern Denmark), Ellen E. Stensrud (The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies) and Angela Muvumba Sellström (The Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala). We have received funding from the Nordic research councils in the humanities and social sciences (NOS-HS) to conduct workshops and seminars on Nordic approaches to R2P and atrocity prevention. We seek to identify characteristic features and contribute to enhanced policies and practice, both in the individual countries and, if possible, as part of a common Nordic approach.

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Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Responsibility to Protect

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The Responsibility to Protect in a Digital Age