The mass atrocities against the Rohingya: Challenges to R2P
This post is based on contributions to a special issue of Global Responsibility to Protect, 2021.
The case of the Rohingya in Myanmar raises some questions that go to the heart of scholarly and political discussions over the responsibility to protect (R2P).
Can R2P be considered a norm, and to what degree does it generate specific action? Is the legitimacy of potential use of force along the third pillar, and thereby the logic of the doctrine itself, still contested? Does the three pillar-structure adequately protect vulnerable minorities?
Over the past decades, most R2P scholars agree that there is consensus that R2P is only meant to respond to the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Further, there is evidence that there is a general expectation internationally that actors act according to R2P. The UN Security Council has repeatedly referred to R2P in situations where civilian populations have been at risk. Most of these resolutions do not include the use of force, which shows that a wide range of tools can be used to implement R2P. In fact, Myanmar is one of very few cases of mass atrocities in which the Security Council has not referred to the principle of protection in a resolution. Indeed, since the UNSC started to debate Myanmar’s human rights situation in 2006, the council has not managed to pass a single resolution addressing the situation in the country. The case of the Rohingya in Myanmar shows that the R2P doctrine still has some major uncertainties and weaknesses that have not been amended some 15 years after its adoption at the World Summit.
Since 2019, I have worked on a special issue of Global Responsibility to Protect in cooperation with Martin Mennecke of the University of Southern Denmark. The aim of this project has been to identify some key reasons why outside actors did not act more resolutely to prevent atrocities against the Rohingya before and after the forcible expulsion of the group from Myanmar in 2017. Based on this research, this post highlights some key lessons for the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine.
The status of R2P as a norm
There was a shared unwillingness among key Western actors and UN agencies on the ground in Myanmar to confront the Myanmar authorities on their Rohingya policies. The unwillingness to put human rights abuses ‘up front’ has been debated and documented before, during and after the 2017 atrocities.
The lack of attention to the atrocity risks in Myanmar raises questions about the strength of R2P as an international and universal norm. Key countries lacked both the analytical tools and institutional capacity to address atrocity crimes.
The unwillingness to call for action according to R2P was shared among Western and regional South East Asian actors. The experience from Myanmar does not support the claim that R2P is a ‘western’ norm threatening the sovereignty of states in other regions.
The means for implementing R2P, particularly forceful means along ‘pillar three’, are still contested. Nations that support the norm may still express caution about pillar three.
Regional actors’ reactions to the Rohingya crisis show that the principle of non-intervention still overrules commitment to protection. Despite initial outspokenness in some South East Asian countries, ASEAN closed ranks behind the principle of non-intervention.
The region’s most important country, Indonesia, has its own history of international intervention in East Timor, and impunity for human rights abuses by the military, which influences its resistance towards a confrontational line with Myanmar.
Advocates of R2P have argued that the doctrine does not challenge the sovereignty of nation states, but rather redefines it, by stating that protection of populations is a sovereign responsibility. However, the Myanmar case shows that the relation between R2P, state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention is still fraught.
The three pillar structure of R2P
In Myanmar, there has been a lack of R2P efforts at all levels, or along all three ‘pillars’ of R2P.
In Myanmar, as the reforms progressed, hope for national protection through the first pillar waned.
Internationally, there was little appetite among external actors for forceful measures according to pillar three. A UN Security Council resolution authorising use of force was never a realistic option. Sanctions targeting individual military leaders were implemented by some countries, but not in a unified and consequential manner globally.
Regional actors who arguably could have had some influence over Myanmar, such as Indonesia and ASEAN, upheld the principle of non-intervention.
Protection through the second pillar – international support for national protection efforts – became difficult both because of lack of willingness nationally, and because the otherwise positive democratic developments overshadowed the severity of the situation for the Rohingya.
International engagement with Myanmar in the years before 2017, largely focused on deepening political and economic engagement, rather than addressing atrocity risks.
In sum, the lack of protection through pillar one, the nation state, did not in the case of Myanmar lead to protection through the other pillars.
R2P in the context of reforms
The political changes during the reform years in Myanmar serve as a crucial backdrop in understanding international responses to the Rohingya crisis, as these reforms fundamentally altered Myanmar’s relations with the outside world. Western actors in particular changed their policies from isolation and sanctions to eager engagement and dialogue. This new dynamic changed how the Rohingya crisis was interpreted and thereby the potential to act according to the R2P doctrine.
Against this backdrop, the three pillar structure of R2P did not work to protect the Rohingya. The first pillar refers to the nation states’ primary responsibility to protect their populations. The second pillar refers to the international community’s responsibility to assist states to protect their own populations. The third pillar refers to the international community’s responsibility to intervene, if necessary by force, if the first two pillars ‘manifestly fail’. While protection nationally (pillar one) became difficult due to an increasingly anti-Muslim climate, international support for protection (pillar two) was not prioritised because of the shifting policies of Western countries towards Myanmar during the reform years, and because of regional unwillingness to prioritise human rights issues. Finally, international protection by force was never possible in a unified and coordinated manner, due to the position of China (and potentially Russia) at the Security Council.